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Abstract
Business interest groups are crucial actors for tax policy-making, but it is still
unclear under which conditions they are more successful than politicians in shaping
taxation. This article argues that centralized coordination and high-levels of policy
integration make business interest groups more inuential in the tax policy-making
process. If there is no ideological convergence between agenda-setters and business,
highly centralized, and well-integrated business interest groups are more successful in
blocking or softening revenue-raising tax reforms, or simply transferring tax burdens
to consumers or non-organized citizens. To evaluate this theoretical framework, I have
compiled an original data set on business groups and associations for 18 countries in
Latin America between 1990 and 2010. This theory uncovers a strong link between
the patterns of business coordination and the feasibility of implementing distributive
tax policies. This article also contributes to the study of business politics beyond the
limited sample of developed countries.
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Introduction
The increasing volatility of international nancial markets and international commodity
prices has substantially raised the level of scal stress for governments in developed and
developing countries. Central governments not only face growing political pressures to raise
social expenditures, but they also have limited policy tools available to manage scal policy.
Access to external debt is more restricted than some decades ago1 and the use of mone-
tary policy to fund governments is now less common.2 Some governments have access to
extraordinary natural resources revenues; however, the increasing volatility of international
oil prices can call into question the sustainability of a scal policy based on oil revenues.3
Consequently, tax reforms are unavoidably the main ingredient of any scal decit reduction
plan.
Comparative politics literature has investigated the politics of tax reform by focusing on
the role of political and economic institutions (Poterba and Von Hagen 1999; Persson and
Tabellini 2003; Rodden 2006; Hallerberg, Scartascini, and Stein 2009), the government?s
ability to capitalize crisis environments (Alesina and Drazen 1991; Mahon 2004; Fisher 2009;
Alt, Preston, and Sibieta 2010), and the bargaining between agenda-setters and legislators
(Schick 1980; Profeta and Scabrosetti 2008; Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons 2009).
Yet this work does not provide a full account of the variation in the implementation of
revenue-raising tax reforms because it overlooks the role of the most important actors in tax
policymaking: business interest groups. Firms and business organizations play an obvious
and central role in scal policymaking, but their role has not been systematically analyzed,
especially in the context of developing countries (Smith et al. 2014). Scholars and pun-
dits simply argue that money buys inuence, or that business interest groups have hijacked
democratic governments. However, there have been very few attempts to understand the
1External debt to GNI ratios of developing countries fell down substantially since the 1980s (World Bank
2011). For a long-term empirical analysis of external and domestic public debt in developing countries please
see Reinhart and Rogo (2011)
2Please see Cartens and Jacome (2005)
3Please see Collier and Venables (2011)
2
mechanisms that eectively translate business inuence into specic policy outcomes, or un-
der which particular conditions business are more successful than politicians and technocrats
in shaping policies (Baumgartner et al. 2009, Culpepper 2011, Faireld 2015).
In contrast, this article highlights the importance of business interest groups for the
analysis of tax policymaking. In particular, I argue that cross-country variation in tax rev-
enues mainly depends on the interaction between the policy preferences of the agenda-setter
(presidents and/or nance ministers) and the domestic patterns of business coordination.
I develop a theory that builds from the existing literature on varieties of capitalism and
business interest groups (Hall and Soskice 2001; Martin and Swank 2004; Culpepper 2011;
Schneider 2013) and incorporates the patterns of business coordination as a crucial factor in
explaining scal policy. I argue that centralized coordination and policy integration jointly
make business interest groups more eective for lobbying activities, and consequently, more
inuential in shaping tax policy.
The rationale of the theory is straightforward. Agenda-setters (presidents and/or nance
ministers) and business interest groups have distinctive preferences over types of taxation
(direct vs. indirect), tax rates (corporate, income, value-added taxes, etc.), and special
provisions (i.e. tax deduction, tax credits). For the agenda-setters, these preferences are
usually partisan-oriented or simply depend on the characteristics of the government coalition.
For example, left-wing governments usually extract higher levels of tax revenues to nance
distributive social programs, and right-wing governments collect fewer taxes in order to
promote private investment and stimulate economic growth (Boix 1998, 11).
Meanwhile, business usually prefers low corporate tax rates, and its preferences about
personal income and value-added taxes are generally more ambiguous. These preferences are
usually subordinated to their market strategies and their sources of comparative advantage
regarding potential competitors (Culpepper 2011; Schneider 2013). Consequently, under
some circumstances, business will lobby against increasing personal income tax; but under
other circumstances, they would support increases in personal income tax.
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These actors' preferences are obviously consequential for tax policy, but only under par-
ticular institutional and organizational settings. Consequently, I argue that revenue-raising
tax reforms are most likely to occur if there is discord between business and agenda setters'
preferences, and the resulting tax policy will depend on business groups' organizational ca-
pacity (varying from centralized to decentralized coordination) to curtail the eect of the
agenda-setters' policy preferences.
I test this argument for a sample of Latin American countries between 1990 and 2010.
This is a very relevant sample for two reasons. First, the countries selected are all middle-
income, allowing for variance in the level of economic growth, economic diversication, and
business organizational capacity. Second, these countries are all presidential regimes, for
which there is a clear identication of agenda-setters' preferences. Because some of the
relevant data are not available for this a sample of countries, I built an original database
of business organizations in 18 Latin American countries between 1990 and 2010. These
data were collected from institutional archives, personal visits to business associations, and
interviews with business' representatives and policy experts. The resulting dataset is unique
source for a region characterized by low levels of data transparency, lack of information
about lobbying, and almost non-existent data on interest groups (see Appendix for more
information).
Overall, this analysis nds strong support for the existence of a systematic link between
the patterns of business coordination and tax policy, challenging the widespread argument
that agenda-setters in Latin America are the dominant actors in scal policy-making. These
ndings enrich political-economy theories of democratic governance by modeling the role of
business interest groups in policy-making and its implications for policy change. Therefore,
this article not only oers an innovative way to analyze the sources of business power of
inuence, but it also oers a new theoretical approach for the analysis of tax reforms. Finally,
this article also makes an important contribution for the study of business politics beyond
the limited sample of developed countries.
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Business Coordination and Tax Policy
Literature on special interest groups has long noted that the distribution of the tax burden
reects the distribution of power among societal groups and the variation in their policy pref-
erences (Bartlett 1973; Salamon and Siegfried 1977; Wilson 1983; Hettich and Winer 1988;
Steinmo 1989). This literature suggests that state actors and their preferences play a crucial
role in public policymaking, and consequently, dierent constitutional and electoral struc-
tures explain the cross-regional variation in tax systems (Hettich and Winer 1988; Steinmo
1989). For example, Steinmo (1989) demonstrates that the structure of decision-making has
denitively shaped tax policy in Britain, Sweden, and United States. Similar arguments are
quite common among scholars studying decision-making process in Latin America (Spiller
and Tommasi 2007; Stein and Tomassi 2008). This institutional perspective does not ignore
interest groups, but put them in a second level of analysis. These scholars are usually more
interested in the institutional background in which people make decisions.
Most recently, some scholars have paid more attention to the role of interest groups in
decision making and argue that the variation in the patterns of interest groups' internal
organization seem to have substantial eects on the implementation of welfare, social, and
economic policies in western democracies (Martin and Swank 2004; Culpepper 2011; Schnei-
der 2013). Similarly, scholarship on varieties of capitalism also shows that dierent patterns
in the organization of capital and its relationship with labor sectors aect public policy
outcomes (Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Schneider 2013). This literature nds that business
interest groups can inuence policy making not only if they can aord to do it, but also if
they are able to solve internal free-rider problems. For example, Martin and Swank (2001,
2004) have demonstrated that the organization of employers - the so-called social corporatist
organization of business - shapes social policy support among rms and make them more
prone to support redistributive social programs. In fact, they show that the \centralization
and coordination of employers as well as the integration of employer organizations in corpo-
ratist policy-making forums are strongly associated with shares of national income devoted
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to active labor market policy" in western democracies (Martin and Swank 2004, 593).
While the inuence of business interest groups in policy-making process is incontrovert-
ible, its policy consequences are ambiguous, and its causal mechanisms are understudied. We
know that money buys inuence (de Figueiredo and Ritcher 2013) and that the patterns of
business organization matter (Martin and Swank 2004). However, we know very little about
the organizational attributes that make business interest groups more or less inuential in
the policy-making process and the causal mechanisms that transform such inuence into
specic policy outcomes.
Based on Martin and Swank (Martin 1991; Martin and Swank 2004; Swank and Martin
2001), I propose a theory of policy change that focuses on business coordination to explain
variation in tax policy. This theory models business groups' political action as a \reac-
tive" strategy that is only triggered when their policy preferences contrast with those of
the agenda-setter and depends on their internal capacity to coordinate political inuence
activities.
Let me explain the rationale of this theory. The agenda-setters (i.e. presidents or -
nance ministers), as the rst movers in the policy-making process, have an advantage in
scal politics: their policy preferences set agenda priorities (Cox and McCubbins 2005). The
agenda-setters' policy preferences might be categorized into two ideal types: some agenda-
setters could be classied as taxers if their most preferred scal policy is to increase tax
burdens (rather than reduce expenditures); meanwhile, some agenda-setters could be classi-
ed as non-taxers if their most preferred scal policy is to reduce expenditures (rather than
increase tax burdens).4 In general, these policy preferences reect their partisan linkages
and the alliances they make during and after electoral campaigns.
Obviously, the agenda-setters' preferences are not exogenous to the political or economic
context. Indeed, their preferences might be very dierent if the central bank is not indepen-
dent from the central government (the government might have unusual access to domestic
4Fiscal decit is not a credible policy option because it is not sustainable in the long term and implies
high political costs for the agenda-setters (Alesina, Carloni, and Lecce 2011).
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and/or external debt) or if there is an extraordinary availability of natural resources (i.e. oil
or natural gas). However, these policy alternatives could be considered exogenous distortions
rather than deciding factors in the scal policy game. Thus, when facing scal stress situa-
tions, the agenda-setters are constrained to choose between more taxes or less expenditures
as the main policy tools to attain scal balance.
Evaluating the role of the agenda-setters in the scal policy-making process also requires
assessing their capacity to transform preferences into actual policies (i.e. their capacity
to pass legislation in congress). I will refer to this capacity as partisan power. That is,
the extent to which the agenda-setter controls their own party (or legislative coalition),
and whether or not their party (or legislative coalition) has a majority of seats in congress
(Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, 40).5 Thus, we might contend that if the agenda-setters'
party (or coalition) has too few seats in the legislature or is highly fragmented it will be
more dicult to transform preferences into actual policies (Mainwaring 1993).
Now, let us examine the business-side of the scal policy game. Research on the role
of business interest groups in scal policy-making is still very limited (Coen, Grant, and
Wilson 2010) and does not oer any parsimonious explanations about the factors that make
business more or less inuential. Traditional scholarship argues that there are two types of
political power that enable business to inuence the policy-making process: structural and
instrumental power (Miliband 1969; Lindblom 1977). From this perspective, the political
inuence of business interest groups depends on their capacity to withhold investment and
lower economic growth - structural power - (Lindblom 1977), and their nancial capacity to
spend resources in political actions like lobbying, campaign spending, or informal networking
- instrumental power (Miliband 1969).6
This scholarship provides useful insights into the dynamics of business political inuence,
but it overlooks the eect that dierent models of business coordination could have on the
5Any focus on constitutional powers (e.g. veto, partial veto, or decree powers) would be disadvantageous
because the real eect of such constitutional instruments cannot be accurately measured from a comparative
perspective (Metcalf 2000).
6Faireld (2015) uses this framework to explain recent tax reforms in Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile.
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relationship between business and government. In other words, this literature does not
recognize that the internal structure of business organizations shapes not only their policy
preferences and strategies, but also policymakers' preferences and actions.
For example, in centrally coordinated business environments, business interest groups
are usually more focused on broad and collective goals, and encompassing associations con-
centrate major representational power (Martin and Swank 2004; Martin and Swank 2012).
These encompassing associations are also generally well integrated to policy-making forums
and have access to pivotal actors in the policy process.
In contrast, in decentralized business environments, business interests groups are usually
more focused on particularistic policy goals and resources available for lobbying activities
are less predictable (Martin and Swank 2004; Martin and Swank 2012). Their level of
integration to policy-making forums and their access to policymakers also vary substantially
from one economic sector to another. Consequently, business will focus their lobbying eorts
on particularistic issues and will spend more resources in legislative lobbying, only because
it is relatively inexpensive and individual legislators are more responsive to tangible benets
(Grossman 2002).
Consequently, revenue-raising tax reforms will be less likely in the presence of highly
coordinated and centralized business associations because, unlike decentralized business in-
terest groups, they can eectively attenuate the inuence of the agenda-setter's preferences
on tax policy outcomes. If the agenda-setters and business interest groups have similar tax
policy preferences (e.g. the president and the nance minister are not taxers), tax reform
will be limited because neither of them is interested in altering the tax structure. However,
if there is no policy convergence (e.g., president and the nance minister are taxers), the
agenda-setters will propose tax increases and business will seek to block such initiatives, or
at least to avoid increases in corporate taxation.
If business interest groups are centrally coordinated, they will have substantial leverage
and organizational resources to block tax reform bills in congress, or even before, when
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technocrats draft them. Even if the agenda-setters strongly prefer to increase taxes, the
presence of highly coordinated business will attenuate their eect on tax policy.
If business interest groups are not centrally coordinated (sector coordination or decen-
tralization are predominant), they will not be well integrated to policy-making forums and
their organizational/nancial resources will be relatively low (or, at least, the availability
of nancial resources will vary across dierent industries). Consequently, business interest
groups will be less able to block tax reform initiatives and they will be only able to reduce
potential impacts on specic industries (those industries with most resources available for
lobbying).
Therefore, this theory of tax policy change suggests that cross-country variation in tax
policy is a conditional function of the domestic patterns of business coordination (central-
ized coordination vs. decentralized/non-coordination) and the agenda-setters' tax policy
preferences. In other words, the agenda power of presidents and nance ministers is always
conditional on the level of internal organization of de-facto veto players like business interest
groups.
This theoretical framework allows us to predict feasible tax policy outcomes based on
the attributes of institutional and non-institutional veto players (Table 1). Therefore, one
can hypothesize that structural tax reforms will be possible only if: i) the agenda-setters
(presidents or nance ministers) strictly prefer increasing taxes over cutting spending; ii)
they have strong partisan powers to promote policy change; and iii) business interest groups
are neither centrally coordinated around encompassing organizations nor well integrated
to the policy-making process. In other words, direct tax burdens will increase (especially
corporate taxes) only if the agenda-setters are taxers, they have strong partisan powers, and
business interests groups are not centrally coordinated (panel II).
If the agenda-setters are taxers and business interest groups are centrally coordinated, tax
reforms will range from minimal to partial (as the agenda-setters' partisan powers increase)
and the likelihood of higher indirect taxes will increase substantially (panels IV and V).
9
Under this scenario, highly coordinated business interest groups would successfully ght
government's attempts to increase corporate tax rates, and the government will be compelled
to nance its expenditures with indirect taxes (e.g. value-added tax) or non-traditional taxes
(e.g. gasoline or nancial transaction taxes). In some cases, business interest groups would
also support increases in personal income tax rates as it reduces the pressure on corporate
taxation.
Table 1: Feasible Tax Outcomes
Type of Agenda-Setter
Taxer Non-Taxer
Partisan Power Partisan Power
Weak Strong Weak Strong
Pattern
Business
Coordina-
tion
Decentralized I. Partial:
high number
loopholes
II. Structural
Tax Reform
III. No tax policy change
Centralized IV. Minimal:
increasing
indirect taxes
V. Partial: in-
creasing indi-
rect taxes
VI. Tax cuts
If the agenda-setters are non-taxers (i.e. business and government have similar tax policy
preferences), tax reforms will not be likely (panel III). In fact, under these circumstances,
if business interest groups are highly coordinated, they could actually promote substantial
tax-cuts (panel VI).
In sum, this theory of policy change suggests that agenda-setters' policy preferences are
not the only factor shaping tax policy. It is also a function of the domestic patterns of business
organization (centralized coordination vs. decentralized/non-coordination). In other words,
there are models of coordination that make business more successful than politicians in the
legislative process and more successful in transferring the tax burden to non-organized or
less-organized groups of citizens.
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Data and Methods
To analyze the capacity of business to curtail agenda power in tax policymaking, I build a
unique panel dataset on business interest groups in Latin America between 1990 and 2010.
These dataset includes original data on basic organizational features of business associations
like centralization, membership, age, and integration to policy boards. It also includes data
on taxes, including total tax revenues, direct and indirect tax revenues for all the countries
in the region (Table 1 in the Appendix presents basic descriptive statistics).
The rst outcome variable measures cross-country variation in tax-to-GDP ratio in Latin
America between 1990 and 2010. The second outcome variable measures cross-country vari-
ation in direct and indirect tax revenues in Latin America between 1990 and 2010. Data on
cross-country variation in general tax burden (% GDP), and direct and indirect taxation (%
total tax revenue) are based on ocial statistics collected by the Statistics Division of the
United Nations - Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
As suggested in the theory section, the main explanatory variables of interest are the
agenda-setter's scal policy preferences and partisan powers, and the degree of internal
business coordination. Abundant literature in comparative political economy suggests that
right-leaning presidents are more scally conservative than left-leaning presidents (Alesina
and Rosenthal 1995; Boix 1998; Johnson and Crisp 2003). Thus, one could assume that
ideological scores are a good measure of the agenda-setters' policy preferences. However,
these scores have two problems. On one hand, the most commonly used data on Latin
American presidents' ideology estimate their economic policy preferences based on partisan
rather than actual policy positions. On the other hand, conventional ideology scores do
not take into account the frequency by which politicians switch their policy preferences after
elections (Stokes 2001) and the fact that partisan dierences on tax policy issues are less clear
than we might think (Hart 2010; Castaneda and Doyle, 2015). For example, it is common
that rightist presidents are less scally conservative than leftist presidents and vice-versa.7
7For example, the Social Democrats (leftist party) in Chile are the regional model for responsible scal
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In order to distinguish between the agenda-setters' ideological preferences and their ac-
tual tax preferences, I built an index of scal policy preferences based on existing datasets
(Coppedge 1997; Huber et al. 2012; Murillo, Oliveros, and Vaishnav 2010) and also original
data I collected in the eld. After compiling information from multiple datasets and lling in
missing data, I coded the agenda-setters (presidents and nance ministers) in the region as
taxers and non-taxers according to their actual willingness to introduce tax reform initiatives
when they were in oce. This coding also relies heavily on press review and third-person
assessments.
For the agenda-setters' partisan powers, I calculated the percentage of seats held by the
president's party (coalition) in the lower chamber of congress. In this case, I rely on data
provided by Perez-Li~nan (2013) on the size of coalitions and factions within the legislative
bodies in Latin America from 1945 to the present.
The theoretical framework also contends that business interests are more inuential as
they become more centrally coordinated around encompassing associations, and they are bet-
ter integrated to policy-making boards. As business interest groups become more centrally
organized and coordinated, they tend to develop political positions that transcend narrow
or particularistic demands of individual rms or sectors and focus on broader collective con-
cerns; consequently, they tend to be more inuential in public policy-making. Additionally,
centrally coordinated business interest groups tend to be better resourced for lobbying and
have a more relevant presence in decisive policy forums.8
Based on these considerations, I built a two-component typology of business coordination
that combines the concepts of business centralization and policy integration to assess the
business interest groups' potential capacity to inuence the policy-making process. For the
rst component, I use the classic measure of business centralization, which evaluates the
governance in Latin America. On the contrary, conservative governments in Mexico (i.e. Calderon 2006-2012)
and Colombia (i.e Pastrana 1998-2002) have been very harmful for scal governance.
8It is possible that a business association could be highly centralized but weakly resourced, but those
cases are exceptional. In the data collected for this project, I found very few cases where highly centralized
and coordinated associations were weakly resourced. Interviews in the eldwork conrm this evidence.
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extent to which there are encompassing associations that represent major industrial sectors.
This is a dichotomous variable with values of one if there is at least one national-peak
business association that represents the interests of the three-main sectors of the economy,
and values of zero if there is no national-peak association, or if there is one, it does not
include the three main sectors of the economy. In this case, I rely on original data that I
collected from press review, eldwork interviews, and short-surveys with policy experts and
sta members of the main business associations in every country included in the analysis.
For the second component, I built a measure of policy integration with values of zero (low
bargaining authority) if the encompassing business associations have no role on important
policy boards or the agreements reached by business and government are non-enforceable.
This measure takes values of one (high bargaining authority) if business monopolize policy
bargaining and the agreements between government and business are enforceable. Let me
explain this with more detail.
The mere existence of encompassing business associations does not guarantee policy inu-
ence if these organizations have limited access to decisive policy-making arenas. Therefore,
we also need to evaluate whether encompassing business associations meet regularly with
government and labor representatives, and whether or not they are active members of de-
cisive policy-making committees. That is, we should assess 1) whether or not there are
centralized mechanisms for market coordination (Iversen 1999), and 2) whether or not busi-
ness interests are active players within these bargaining institutions (Wallerstein, Golden,
and Lange 1997; Iversen, Pontusson, and Soskice 2000). Business interest groups usually
participate in dierent policy commissions/boards. Some of these policy boards are signif-
icant for policy purposes; others are not. From a comparative perspective, it is dicult
to pick just one policy board or forum like the most meaningful one to assess the overall
integration of business into the policymaking process. However, in Latin America, some pol-
icy boards/forums are denitively more relevant than others. In particular, there has been
a long tradition of negotiating minimum wages in this \corporatist" fashion in the region
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(Murillo 2001) and tripartite commissions (business-labor-government), created to set mini-
mum wages in the early stages of the industrialization process, are still important forums of
cooperative engagement between employers, labor, and government. For this reason, these
wage-bargaining institutional mechanisms are quite relevant to measure of the degree to
which business interest groups are integrated to the national-level policy-making process.
Consequently, I collected information about the wage bargaining process for all countries
in the region and identied whether the minimum wage targets are usually dened exclusively
by the national government (without any consultation with business or labor), or by advisory
committees (boards/forums) including representatives from the government, labor unions, or
business associations. I also evaluated whether or not such business associations are pivotal
players in these committees (boards/forums). Finally, I investigated if the minimum wage
targets set by these committees (boards/forums) are enforceable or not. I collected this
information directly from newspapers and current events magazines for every country in the
region for the period 1990-2010.
As mentioned above, our typology of business coordination combines both business cen-
tralization and policy integration. This typology consists of three categories: i) decentralized
coordination: if business interests are coordinated only at the sector/industry level and they
have low bargaining authority; ii) weakly centralized coordination: if business interests are
centrally coordinated but their bargaining authority is low; and iii) centralized coordination:
if business interests are centrally coordinated and they have high levels of bargaining author-
ity. This typology codes each dimension - business centralization and policy integration - as
either being present or absent, and then it generates three `ideal types' according to lowest
or highest scores on these dimensions (Gerring 2007). Observe that this is not an additive
index, therefore the components are not supposed to have equal or dierent weights within
it (Gerring, 2007).
Table 2 classies the main business associations in Latin America according to the two
components of our typology of business coordination. One can observe that business asso-
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Table 2: Patterns of Business Coordination in Latin America, 2010
Business Centralization
Centralized Decentralized
There is an encompassing as-
sociation and it represents the
main industrial sectors
There is not an encompassing
association and/or it does not
represent the main industrial
sectors
Policy
Integra-
tion
Low: Business
and government
set non-enforceable
targets for lower-
level wage bargain-
ing
BOLIVIA: Confederacion de
Empresarios Privados de Bo-
livia (1974); BRAZIL: Acao
Empresarial (1993); COLOM-
BIA: Consejo Gremial Nacional
(1993); PANAMA: Consejo Na-
cional de la Empresa Pri-
vada (1964); PERU: Confed-
eracion Nacional de Institu-
ciones Empresariales Privadas
(1984); VENEZUELA: Federa-
cion Venezolana de Camaras
y Asociaciones de Comercio y
Produccion (1944)
ARGENTINA: Asociacion
Empresaria Argentina (2002);
ECUADOR: Asociacion Na-
cional de Empresarios (1958);
PARAGUAY: No encom-
passing business association;
URUGUAY: No encompassing
business association
WEAKLY CENTRAL-
IZED COORDINATION
DECENTRALIZED OR
NON-COORDINATION
High: Business
monopolizes wage
bargaining and
agreements are
enforceable
CHILE: Confederacion de la
Produccion y del Comercio
(1935); COSTA RICA: Union
Costarricense de Camaras y
Asociaciones de la Empresa
Privada (1975); EL SAL-
VADOR: Asociacion Nacional
de Empresa Privada (1966);
GUATEMALA: Comite Co-
ordinador de Asociaciones
Agricolas, Comerciales, Indus-
triales y Financieras (1957);
HONDURAS: Consejo Hon-
dureno de la Empresa Privada
(1967); MEXICO: Consejo
Coordinador Empresarial
(1976)
CENTRALIZED COOR-
DINATION
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ciations in Argentina, Paraguay, or Uruguay are not centrally coordinated and weakly inte-
grated to the policymaking process (low bargaining authority). Thus, they follow a pattern
of decentralized coordination. Business associations are centrally but weakly coordinated in
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Panama, Peru and Venezuela; and they are weakly integrated to
the policymaking process. Then, they follow a pattern of weakly centralized coordination.
Finally, business interest groups are centrally coordinated in Chile, Central America, and
Mexico, and are well integrated to the policymaking process. Thus, they follow a pattern of
highly centralized coordination.
Therefore, one can expect that business associations in Chile, Mexico or Central Amer-
ica are more inuential and consequential for tax policy than their peers in, for example,
Argentina, Paraguay, or Uruguay. In other words, governments (especially those with redis-
tributive tax preferences) in the rst group of countries will nd it more dicult to impose
their tax preferences than in the second group of countries.
Lastly, I also considered four possible alternative explanations of the variation in tax
policy: industrial concentration, country-level economic performance, size of central gov-
ernment, and lagged trends of scal performance. First, I calculated a country-level index
of industrial concentration that measures the total share in the national production of the
three largest economic sectors as percentage of the GDP. Second, I included three indica-
tors measuring the impact of economic performance at the country-level: economic growth
annual rate, GDP per capita (Chain series 2005 US$), and exchange rate of domestic cur-
rency to US dollars. These covariates measure country-specic economic eects and the
eects of international nancial shocks. Third, I included an indicator of the size of central
government: central government consumption share (% PPP converted GDP per capita).
Finally, I incorporated two indicators to assess the impact of past scal performance at the
country-level: central government debt (as % of GDP) and primary scal balance (as % of
GDP). I also controlled for the eect of the lagged values of these variables and the size of
the country. For these indicators, I relied on data provided by the Penn World Table Version
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(Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2013) and the UN-ECLAC.
Estimation and Results
Treatment and outcome variables are measured at various points of time (1990-2010) for 18
countries in Latin America. Consequently, I estimated two types of models: cross-sectional
xed-eects and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimations. For the panel analysis, the Haus-
man test suggests that xed-eects models are more suitable than random-eects models.
Fixed-eect models not only allow us to explore the relationship between the patterns of
business coordination and tax policy over time, but also to evaluate the impact of within-
country characteristics on predictor variables. Lagrange multiplier and serial correlation
tests indicated the possible presence of serial correlation problems, so all the models were
also corrected for serial correlation in the error term.
The inclusion of lagged dependent variables in time-series cross-sectional models is a
subject of intense debate in political science (Achen 2000; Beck and Katz 2011; Plumper,
Troeger, and Manow 2005). For this reason, I used a dierent approach to model dynamic
data generating processes and ran Arellano-Bond GMM estimators. The Arellano-Bond
dynamic-panel analysis is convenient because the lagged dependent variables are specied as
GMM instruments and all available lags are used as separate instruments. This strategy not
only help us to avoid any problems of nite sample approximation to the distribution of the
estimators, but it also allows us to account for time dynamics and unit-level heterogeneity
(Arellano and Bond 1991; Wawro 2002).
Table 3 presents the models estimating the eect of the variables of interest on tax
policy. Models 1 to 3 estimate regression models for total tax revenue (as % GDP) including
the main explanatory variables and both country and period xed eects. Model 1 is the
baseline model. Model 2 estimates a panel regression with xed-eects and includes control
variables within the specication. As explained above, the lagged dependent variable was not
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included in models 1 and 2 in order to avoid over-specication problems. The eect of lagged
values of the dependent variable are evaluated in model 3, which estimates Arellano-Bond
dynamic-panel estimators for total tax revenues and use two lags of the dependent variable
as instrumental variables. Models 4 and 6 estimate panel regressions with xed-eects for
direct and indirect taxes as % of total tax revenues. Models 5 and 7 estimate Arellano-Bond
dynamic-panel estimators for direct and indirect taxes as % of total tax revenues.
The results presented in Table 3 conrm the hypothesis that centrally coordinated busi-
ness interest groups weaken the positive eect that taxer-type agenda-setters have over the
general tax burden. In Models 1 through 3, the coecients that measure the conditional
eect of centralized business organization on the agenda-setter's policy preferences are in the
theorized direction, statistically signicant, and substantially large.
As predicted in the theory section, the agenda-setter's rst-mover advantage in policy-
making is diluted as business interests are increasingly coordinated and integrated to the
policymaking process. The models suggest that the tax burden increases substantially if the
agenda-setters strongly prefer tax increases over spending cuts, but the eect is signicantly
curtailed as business interest groups are more centrally coordinated and better integrated to
policy-making forums. This conditional eect is robust across dierent model specications.
In fact, the level of signicance for the conditional eects over tax policy holds whether we
include any combination of time- or country-xed eects or none at all.
Results presented in Table 3 also show that macroeconomic factors have small or incon-
sistent eects on tax revenue. Higher levels of industrial concentration negatively impact
tax revenue, but this eect disappears when one includes more systematic temporal eects
in the model estimation (Model 3). The tax burden only increases marginally as the annual
economic growth rate (as %GDP) increases. The eect of GDP per capita and exchange
rates seems to be null. In other words, these estimations suggest that tax revenues are not
signicantly driven by the uctuations of the economic cycle.
However, there is strong empirical evidence that previous scal performance and alter-
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Table 3: Tax Policy and Business Organization, Latin America 1990-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tax Revenue Tax Revenue Tax Revenue Direct Direct Indirect Indirect
FE FE Dynamic FE Dynamic FE Dynamic
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Taxer Agenda-Setter 3.358 3.317 1.271 4.638 2.358 -5.050 -2.473
(0.71) (0.53) (0.43) (1.75) (1.59) (2.05) (1.85)
Partisan Power -0.013+ 0.011+ 0.000 -0.058 -0.015 0.031 0.025
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Business Coordination 2.680 2.971 2.065 1.103 1.131 -1.344 -1.680
(0.63) (0.79) (0.65) (2.59) (2.29) (3.02) (2.83)
Taxer*Coordination -0.988 -0.593 -0.522 -2.039 -1.104+ 1.631+ 0.892
(0.27) (0.22) (0.17) (0.73) (0.62) (0.85) (0.76)
Taxer*Partisan -0.749 -3.982 -0.614 -0.465 -1.493 2.780 2.838
(1.17) (0.92) (0.74) (3.01) (2.64) (3.52) (3.15)
L1.Tax Revenue 0.680
(0.05)
L1.Direct Taxes 0.503
(0.05)
L1.Indirect Taxes 0.653
(0.05)
Industrial Concentration -0.157 0.014 -0.024 -0.035 0.039 0.242
(0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16)
Economic Growth 0.049 0.036 0.015 -0.228+ -0.122 0.240+
(0.05) (0.03) (0.15) (0.12) (0.18) (0.14)
L1.Economic Growth 0.005 -0.015 -0.073 0.027 0.107 0.025
(0.02) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
GDP per capita -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.GDP per capita 0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exchange Rate 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.Exchange Rate -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.002+ 0.003 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Govt. Consumption -0.004 0.151 -0.624 0.121 -0.444 -0.010
(0.16) (0.12) (0.51) (0.43) (0.60) (0.52)
L1.Govt. Consumption 0.031 -0.116 0.658 0.378 0.065 0.034
(0.15) (0.11) (0.49) (0.39) (0.57) (0.46)
Primary Fiscal Balance 0.234 0.244 0.583 0.750 -0.589 -0.737
(0.05) (0.03) (0.16) (0.13) (0.19) (0.15)
L1.Primary Fiscal Bal. 0.096 -0.052 0.307+ 0.025 -0.376 0.043
(0.05) (0.04) (0.16) (0.12) (0.18) (0.14)
Government Debt -0.016 -0.007+ 0.012 -0.019 -0.004 0.024
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
L1.Government Debt -0.001 0.002 -0.038 0.011 0.016 -0.004
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Country Size 8.515 2.751 18.851 14.444 -5.533 -7.190
(1.30) (1.15) (4.28) (3.89) (4.99) (4.50)
N 369 335 317 335 316 335 316
R2 0.221 0.579 0.540 0.410
+ p < 0:10, * p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
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native funding tools are somewhat important to explain variation in tax revenue. First, tax
revenues increase signicantly when central government experienced scal stress in the pre-
vious period. And second, our estimations suggest that there is a trade-o between issuing
debt and raising tax revenues. As one could reasonably expect, central governments seem
to reduce the general tax burden as issuing debt becomes more aordable.
Having found that the eect of agenda-setters' preferences over tax policy outcomes is
signicantly curtailed by business coordination, now we need to analyze how this condi-
tional relationship shapes the trade-o between direct and indirect taxation. As discussed
in the theoretical framework, business community not only has preferences over the general
tax burden but also over the type of taxation. Usually business interest groups are more
concerned about what type of taxes might be raised than about the general tax burden.
For example, business interest groups usually agree that scal balance is important to keep
macroeconomic stability, but they generally prefer the government to fund its activities with
taxes that do not aect investment and productivity. If taxes should be raised, business
interests would generally prefer to increase indirect taxation.
Models 4 through 7 in Table 3 evaluate whether or not the patterns of business coor-
dination shape the trade-o between direct and indirect taxation. These models support
the hypothesis that indirect taxation increases as business interest groups become more cen-
trally coordinated and integrated to the policymaking process. If business interest groups are
centrally coordinated around encompassing associations, the cost of nancing central gov-
ernment?s activities is more likely to be transferred to consumers or citizens - who are not
well organized for collective action, or are not well represented in legislative bodies. Models
4 to 7 also show that, as expected, the type of agenda-setter has substantial eects on the
tax structure. Direct taxes (as % total tax revenues) increase by 14% and indirect taxes (as
% total tax revenues) decrease by 20% if the agenda setter is a taxer-type (in contrast with
a non-taxer agenda-setter). However, this eect is curtailed if the business community is
highly coordinated and well integrated to the policymaking process.
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The conditional eect between agenda-setters' policy preferences and business coordina-
tion is statistically signicant and its magnitude substantial. Direct taxes increase about
4% (as % of total tax revenues) if the agenda-setter is a taxer-type, but the eect drops by
nearly 2% for every increase in the scale of business coordination. Similarly, indirect taxes
decrease about 5% of total tax revenues if the agenda-setter is a taxer-type, but they increase
nearly 1.6% for every additional point in the scale of business coordination.
Based on the results presented in Table 3, I computed the marginal eects of the agenda-
setters' preferences when the moderating variable (business coordination) is held constant
at dierent combinations of high, medium, and low values. Figure 1 illustrates these linear
combinations and the interaction eect between agenda-setter type and business coordina-
tion. Panel (a) illustrates the interaction eect for tax revenues (as % GDP); panel (b)
shows the interaction eect for direct taxes (as % total tax revenues); and panel (c) shows
the interaction eect for indirect taxes (as % total tax revenues). These marginal eects cor-
respond to the rst derivative of dierent tax outcomes with respect to the agenda-setters'
policy preferences at dierent levels of business coordination and holding partisan powers
constant at 66%. Consequently, the estimated marginal eects assess whether or not the
eect of agenda-setters' policy preferences is curtailed as we introduce changes in the degree
of business coordination.
The theoretical model predicts that the eect of taxer-type agenda-setters would slow
down, as business interest groups are better coordinated and integrated to the policy-making
process. It also predicts that the presence of centrally coordinated business interest groups
will provide strong incentives for the governments to privilege indirect taxation as the main
source of tax revenue. Panels (a) to (c) in Figure 1 are broadly consistent with these
expectations in demonstrating that business coordination curtails the eect of taxer-type
agenda-setters in the predicted directions. Panels (a) to (c) in Figure 1 also show that
the eect of the rst-mover's policy preferences (presidents and nance ministers) decreases
substantially as the level of business coordination increases.
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Figure 1: Joint Eects Agenda-Setters' Preferences and Business Coordination
Whiskers mark the 95% condence intervals cut-os. Partisan powers were xed at 66% for the
calculation of linear combinations. Linear calculations were calculated based on Table 3, model
2, models 2, 4, and 6.
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Figure 1 also presents strong evidence that total tax revenues and direct tax revenues
decrease as business interest groups become better coordinated - panels (a) and (b) -, and
the variation in business coordination shapes the policy trade-o between direct and indirect
taxation - panels (b) and (c). As business interest groups become better coordinated, indirect
taxation prevails over direct taxation (especially corporate taxes) as the main policy tool to
fund government spending. Consequently, business interest groups' policy preferences and
their organizational capacity seem to eectively shape scal policy choices.
Robustness Checks
In order to test the robustness of the results presented in the previous section, I tested
the models for the presence signicant outliers or inuential observations. In particular, I
looked for substantial dierences between predicted (based on the xed-eects regressions)
and observed values. The presence of observations with large residuals would suggest sample
peculiarities or data errors. A simple leverage analysis allows us to observe if the values of
the coecients deviate from their mean and if those \high leverage" points have a substantial
eect on the estimate. This analysis not only identies these \high leverage" (or inuential)
observations, and calculates Cook's distances, but also removes them from the statistical
analysis to check if the estimates change signicantly.
Figure A-1 in the Appendix shows leverage versus the squared residuals for the xed-
eects regression models explaining tax revenues, and the trade-o between direct and indi-
rect taxation. In the upper panel, one can observe that there are several outlier observations
in the model for tax revenues. In particular, some observations for Venezuela (1990, 1997,
2010), Bolivia (1996, 2006, 2007, 2008), and Ecuador (2010) have either high leverage or
large residuals. The leverage analysis for the model on direct taxation also identies some
outlier observations: Venezuela 1996-1998; Guatemala 1991; Colombia 1990, 1992. There
are some similar outlier observations in the model for indirect taxation (Paraguay 1991;
Venezuela1991, 1996, 1998). The leverage analysis presented in Figure A-1 in the Appendix
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also suggests that there are some countries that could potentially distort the statistical anal-
ysis. Interestingly, most of the outlier observations correspond to countries with economies
that depend highly on natural resources revenues. In fact, Figure A-1 shows that observa-
tions for Venezuela (in dierent years) have either high leverage or large residuals.
I calculated Cook's D values for these outlier observations and found out that they are
high but never larger than 1 (the rule of thumb for robust regression techniques is that we
should exclude values higher than 1 from the robust regression analysis), which suggests that
these values are not very inuential. Nevertheless, I dropped observations with either high
leverage or large residuals and ran the xed-eects models again in order to check if the
statistical results hold up. Results are presented in Table A-1 in the Appendix (rst three
models).
The results are quite compelling. If we exclude Venezuela, the dierences between pre-
dicted and observed values are minimal. The eects of the main variables of interest and the
interaction term are still signicant and are in the expected direction. In fact, the models 1
through 6 in Table A-1 in the Appendix show that centralized patterns of business coordina-
tion downgrade the eect of taxer-type agenda-setters on tax policy. These models are still
well tted even after we dropped a substantial number of observations. These results are also
quite consistent even when certain periods or certain countries (potential outliers) are re-
moved from the statistical analysis and when estimators are corrected for serially correlation
in Model 3.
Endogeneity Issues
The previous analysis nds empirical support for the hypothesis concerning to the role of
the domestic models of business organization in shaping tax policy. However, the character-
istics and dynamics of the explanatory variables might raise questions about endogeneity.
One might reasonably argue that the eect of business coordination on tax policy outcomes
could be enhanced by previously implemented tax policies that could benet or hurt busi-
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ness interest groups by improving or damaging their internal coordination. In other words,
there are reasons to believe that the independent variables could be potentially related to
unobserved determinants of the outcome variable.
There are several ways to deal with endogeneity, but most of them are focused on the use
of instrumental variables to replace the problematic independent variable with a proxy vari-
able that is uncontaminated by error or unobserved factors that aect the outcome (Sovey
and Green 2011, 188). The rationale is straightforward: if some independent variables are
systematically related to unobserved causes of the outcome variables (two-way causation
problem), then one needs to estimate those independent variables as a function of instru-
mental (exogenous) variables, generate predicted values of the independent variables, and
estimate the outcomes variables based on those predicted values. These instrumental vari-
ables could be random or \plausibly" random factors that are unrelated to the unmeasured
causes of the outcome variables (Sovey and Green 2011, 190).
The procedure consists of two-stage estimations. In the rst stage, the results of the
regression are used to generate predicted values for the endogenous variables. In the second
stage, the endogenous variables can be replaced by their predicted values. It is reasonable to
think that the implementation of any tax policy could aect the domestic levels of business
coordination. For example, if recent tax policies privileged corporate taxation over indi-
rect taxation, one might expect that business associations saw their organizational capacity
undermined because rms and sectorial business associations would redirect their resources
to lobbying activities aimed to protect particularistic interest rather than broad, collective
interest. These strategic responses would weaken the encompassing business associations?
ability to coordinate cross-sectorial actions. Consequently, it is plausible that tax policies
and business coordination are simultaneously determined.
In order to tackle this methodological problem, I estimated an instrumental-variable re-
gression using the age of encompassing business associations (since their date of creation)
as the instrumental variable for business coordination. This choice has several advantages.
25
Table 4: Instrumental Variables Regression
First Stage Regression
(1) (2) (3)
Tax Revenue Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Age 0.022***
(0.01)
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression
(1) (2) (3)
Tax Revenue Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Taxer Agenda-Setter 2.537*** -0.084 1.458
(0.32) (1.02) (1.04)
Partisan Powers 0.035*** 0.029 -0.038
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Business Coordination -0.948*** 0.045 1.400
(0.36) (1.15) (1.17)
N 353 352 352
R2
+ p < 0:10, * p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
First, this indicator is correlated with the endogenous independent variable (business coordi-
nation), but it is uncorrelated with the endogenous dependent variable (tax policy outcomes).
Second, there is a positive correlation between the age of the encompassing business associ-
ations and the degree of business coordination, thus it passes one key requirement for being
a good instrument (Sovey and Green 2011, 190). Third, the age of encompassing business
associations is independent of the error term. And nally, the age of encompassing business
associations strongly predicts the degree of business coordination after controlling for co-
variates. Consequently, the age of encompassing business associations is both relevant and
exogenous, which are the main conditions for being a good instrument.
The results presented in Table 4 suggest that the age of encompassing business asso-
ciations is highly and signicantly correlated with business coordination. In the rst-stage
regressions, the age of encompassing business associations has a positive and signicant eect
on business coordination. The estimators resulting from the instrumental variables (2SLS)
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regression models remain consistent with the results presented in Table 3 and Table A-1: the
non-conditional eect of business coordination is not signicant, but its conditional eect
remains statistically signicant (except for indirect taxes). Therefore, our estimators are
not only consistent across dierent model specications, but also across dierent tests for
inuential cases and endogeneity issues.
Concluding Remarks
Much of the debate about scal policy-making has focused on the eect of institutional
settings on policy outcomes. The role of economic or political actors is rarely in the center of
the debate. Surprisingly, this is particularly true in the case of business interest groups and
the crucial role that rms and business organizations play in scal (economic) policy. While
scholars and pundits maintain that money buys inuence or that business interest groups
have hijacked democratic governments, there have been very few attempts to understand
the mechanisms that eectively translate business political inuence into specic policy
outcomes. This paper highlights the importance of the organizational attributes of business
interest groups for the analysis of tax policy-making.
The empirical analysis presented in this article sought to demonstrate that business
interest groups are key actors in the scal policymaking process and they shape agenda-
setters' ability to successfully enact raising-revenues tax reforms. This article presents strong
empirical evidence that business interest groups have a preponderant role for the denition
of the general tax burden and the selection of dierent tax policy tools in Latin America.
However, their role is reactive rather than proactive. Encompassing business associations,
industry-level association, conglomerates, and rms display their power of inuence only
when the agenda-setter strongly prefers to increase taxes over cut expenditures (taxer-type)
as his optimal scal strategy. Thus, centrally coordinated business interest groups always
curtail the eect of taxer-type agenda-setters on tax policy outcomes.
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The empirical evidence shown in this article supports the theoretical claim that general
and direct tax collection will decrease as business interest groups become more powerful and
organized, even when agenda-setters strongly prefer to increase taxes. Additionally, this
article provides empirical evidence that indirect taxation will substantially increase if the
business interest groups are centrally coordinated, even their preferences clash with those of
the agenda-setter.
Therefore, this article oers a comprehensive empirical argument to analyze the politics
of tax reform. In particular, I present strong empirical evidence that successful tax reforms
will not only depend on the bargaining between the executive and the legislative branches
of government, but also on the characteristics of non-institutional veto players and their
capacity to spend resources for inuencing the scal policymaking process. This article also
oers an innovative way to analyze and measure the sources of the business interest groups?
power of inuence. It not only oers a new theoretical approach but also new methodological
tools to understand how business interest groups are actually inuential for policymaking
process.
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Appendix
Table A1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent Variables
Tax Revenue (% GDP) 13.15 3.461 6.5 25 369
Direct Taxes (% total tax revenue) 32.214 13.3 9.4 88.3 375
Indirect Taxes (% total tax revenue) 65.235 12.869 11.7 88.100 375
Corporate Tax Rate 29.183 6.763 0 50 378
Value-Added Tax Rate 12.739 5.131 0 23 375
Independent Variables
Tax Policy Preferences 0.41 0.492 0 1 378
Partisan Powers 0.523 0.165 0.1 1 378
Business Coordination 1.23 0.799 0 2 378
Control Variables
Market Concentration 49.099 6.2 33.5 62.7 378
Country Size (log) 9.452 1.128 7.79 12.158 378
Economic Growth (annual rate) 3.804 3.719 -10.9 18.3 378
Primary Fiscal Balance (%GDP) 0.587 2.273 -11.5 8.800 364
Exchange rate ($US to domestic) 345.467 997.149 0 6424.3 378
Government Consumption (%GDP) 9.069 5.272 3.1 38.9 378
GDP per capita ($US) 6455.843 2681.815 1750.9 12524.8 378
Government Debt (%GDP) 46.152 37.068 8.700 289.6 360
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Table A2: Tax Policy and Business Organization, Latin America 1990-2010 (excluding out-
liers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax Revenue Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes Tax Revenue Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes
(excl. outliers) (excl. outliers) (excl. outliers) (excl. Vnzla.) (excl. Vnzla.) (excl. Vnzla)
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Taxer 2.890*** 4.265* -4.361* 3.093*** 4.435* -5.217*
(0.49) (1.76) (2.10) (0.52) (1.87) (2.22)
Partisan 0.007 -0.075*** 0.052* 0.010+ -0.079*** 0.053*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Coordination 1.711* -5.681+ 2.364 2.617*** -5.818+ 2.414
(0.86) (3.14) (3.72) (0.88) (3.14) (3.72)
Taxer* Coord. -0.445* -2.107*** 1.197+ -0.418* -2.113*** 1.185+
(0.20) (0.73) (0.87) (0.21) (0.73) (0.87)
Taxer*Partisan -3.746*** 1.675 1.123 -4.067*** 1.324 2.724
(0.84) (3.01) (3.59) (0.90) (3.23) (3.82)
Concentration -0.184*** -0.066 0.028 -0.192*** -0.059 -0.050
(0.04) (0.14) (0.17) (0.04) (0.15) (0.18)
Growth 0.060 0.068 -0.212 0.067 0.109 -0.210
(0.04) (0.15) (0.18) (0.04) (0.15) (0.18)
L1.Growth 0.009 -0.057 0.089 0.009 -0.032 0.083
(0.02) (0.07) (0.09) (0.02) (0.07) (0.09)
GDP -0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.GDP 0.001 0.003 -0.005* 0.001 0.003+ -0.005*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exch. Rate 0.000 0.003+ 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.Exch. Rate -0.000 -0.004*** 0.003 -0.000 -0.004* 0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Govt. Cons. 0.066 -0.826+ -0.355 0.014 -0.845+ -0.315
(0.14) (0.50) (0.60) (0.14) (0.51) (0.60)
L1.Govt. Cons. 0.002 0.933* -0.048 -0.011 0.934+ -0.151
(0.13) (0.47) (0.57) (0.14) (0.49) (0.57)
Fiscal Balance 0.235*** 0.447*** -0.379+ 0.219*** 0.404* -0.403*
(0.04) (0.16) (0.20) (0.05) (0.17) (0.20)
L1.Fiscal Bal. 0.083+ 0.381* -0.532*** 0.084+ 0.348* -0.506*
(0.05) (0.16) (0.20) (0.05) (0.17) (0.20)
Govt. Debt -0.014*** 0.013 -0.010 -0.021*** 0.012 -0.008
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
L1.Govt. Debt -0.001 -0.038* 0.019 0.004 -0.037+ 0.016
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Country Size 6.868*** 17.671*** -2.254 6.707*** 17.226*** -1.702
(1.21) (4.32) (5.13) (1.22) (4.36) (5.16)
N 325 313 307 302 302 302
R2 0.599 0.579 0.445 0.611 0.583 0.449
+ p < 0:10, * p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Estimated with country and year xed-eects (not shown)
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Figure A1: Leverage Analyses to Identify Possible Outliers/Inuential Cases
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